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Echoing Sentiments  
Art and Melancholy in the Work of Pleshette DeArmitt 
Michael Naas 
DePaul University  
“twinkling . . .” 
—from a poem by Seraphine Saghafi 
 
During those first few days, those first few weeks, truth be told, still 
today, something in me has wanted simply to echo the sentiments of others. 
That’s because I myself didn’t know exactly what to say and, truth be told, I 
still don’t know today. But it’s also because others, including and especially 
some of the people here today, beginning with my co-panelists and, perhaps 
especially, early on, Leigh Johnson, knew at the time just what had to be said 
and so expressed so well the sentiments that we all—that I at least—just 
wanted to echo. Just to echo, that’s what I wanted to do, because by echoing 
the sentiments of others I would be able to protect myself just a bit longer, I 
thought, though also, I self-justified, by echoing others I would be able to 
give back in some way to Pleshette herself, who showed us in her work that 
Echo does not simply repeat but initiates even when it looks or sounds as if 
she is not, Echo who gives back even when it sounds as if she has nothing to 
give, Echo who not only has her own Narcissus but her own narcissism—
which Pleshette would have been the first to tell us is not only not a bad 
thing but a necessary one, and perhaps just what is needed for a new 
thinking of empathy, of mourning, and, perhaps, as I will try to say, of the 
ephemeral. 
 While I will thus no doubt end up, for good or ill, echoing the 
sentiments and thoughts of others—indeed, as you can hear, I’ve already 
begun to do so—I will start out from a very different place in Pleshette’s 
work, that is, from her writings on Sarah Kofman, a thinker who allowed 
Pleshette to continue her analysis of the logic of narcissism, but who also 
gave her a different, though hardly unrelated, way to think through 
questions of “art and doubles, beauty and ruin, life and death, as well as 
mourning and melancholy.”1  
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A deep admiration for Sarah Kofman’s work was, I should say, 
something Pleshette and Kas and I all shared; we often talked about her 
work at DePaul, we lamented how neglected her work had been, but we also 
took the time to celebrate that work, in particular when Pleshette, more or 
less singlehandedly, organized on October 12, 2001 the first ever conference 
in the United States devoted exclusively to the work of Sarah Kofman. It was 
an extraordinary day, full of intelligent and enlightening papers, but also 
full of emotions too uncanny to isolate or define, for as we sat in DePaul’s 
Richardson Library in Chicago that October to discuss Kofman’s work the 
ruins of the World Trade Towers were still smoldering. We thus read and 
discussed papers written weeks in advance about Kofman’s Prometheus and 
her gift for playing with fire, about her two final books on Nietzsche, 
Explosion I and Explosion II, and we recalled—as we looked out the 
window at planes that never seemed so tentative in their flight patterns over 
the city—Kofman’s art of affirmation, her intelligence but also her humor 
and her life, her traumatic childhood during the Second World War and her 
early death. The product of that conference, the trace of that extraordinary 
event, is the beautiful little volume Sarah Kofman’s Corpus, edited by Tina 
Chanter and Pleshette, who honored Kofman not only with the conference 
and with the volume but with their own contributions, which are among the 
most powerful and illuminating in the volume. 
Indeed Pleshette’s essay in the volume, titled “Sarah Kofman’s Art of 
Affirmation, or the ‘Non-Illusory Life of an Illusion,’” is about as good a 
primer on Kofman’s aesthetics, though really on Kofman’s work more 
generally, that you will find anywhere. Compact, beautifully written and 
structured, the essay manages not only to summarize, indeed to echo, 
Kofman’s arguments about art and affirmation but to rethink and rearrange 
those arguments, pose questions to them, and, in the end, sign and endorse 
them in a totally unique way. 
I would like to pay homage to that reading here today because this little 
work could easily go unnoticed, like Sarah Kofman herself, and because 
Pleshette’s strategy in approaching Kofman’s work is not at all apparent at 
first glance. That is, in part, because the book that is at the center of her 
analysis, Kofman’s 1985 Mélancholie de l’art, has never appeared in its 
entirely in English. There are excerpts published in the Stanford volume of 
Kofman’s Selected Writings, but the whole text has never been translated—
and Pleshette’s essay really addresses the whole text, from its title to its back 
cover and everything in between.2 Pleshette in fact begins with that back 
cover, or, more precisely, she begins simultaneously with a passage about 
two thirds of the way through the volume and with the echo of that passage 
on the back cover. As Pleshette rightly argues, Kofman in effect gives us on 
that back cover the overall argument of her book in four moments or four 
movements that Pleshette herself will then use to structure her own essay, 
which consists of a brief introduction and then four sections, each preceded 
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by an epigraph taken from that back cover—words that, as far as I know, 
had never been translated into English before Pleshette’s essay. The first line 
on the back cover reads this way, in Pleshette’s translation: “And what if the 
beauty that conceals the evanescent nature of all things were itself 
ephemeral?” That’s how Kofman begins the description of her own book, a 
description that bears the initials S. K. There is no attribution of this first 
line, no proper name attached to it, but Pleshette is right to hear in it not just 
an echo of Freud but a quasi-quotation of him. For about two thirds of the 
way through Mélancholie de l’art Kofman writes: 
In a very beautiful text, Freud emphasizes the distress 
produced by the following thought: beauty—which is 
meant to camouflage the evanescent nature of all things—
is itself ephemeral. What is at issue in this distress is a 
foretaste of the mourning that would be occasioned by the 
decline or loss of beauty. 
And Kofman then cites Freud: 
It is impossible that all this beauty [the original has 
loveliness] of Nature and Art, of the world of our 
sensations and of the world outside, will really fade away 
into nothing. . . . Somehow or other this beauty 
[loveliness] must be able to persist and to escape all the 
powers of destruction.3  
“This refusal to mourn beauty,” Kofman then comments, “reveals the 
intolerable nature of all ephemeral things,” and it explains, in short, why art 
is called upon to mask this intolerable nature.4 
 Now the text in question here is Freud’s brief, three-page essay of 1915 
“On Transience,” sometimes referred to as “Freud’s Requiem,” an essay in 
which Freud recounts a conversation he would have had with Rilke and Lou 
Andreas-Salomé about the transience of beauty and the possibility of 
affirming, rather than being despondent over or rebelling against, that 
transience.5 This little essay of Freud’s, so minor when set against his entire 
corpus, so fragile, written one year into the war, exactly a century ago, 
would be, according to Pleshette, at the center of Kofman’s own reflections 
about art. Cited within Mélancholie de l’art and then echoed on its back cover, 
at once protected and exposed, this center would then be the starting point 
for Pleshette’s own reflections on Kofman. 
As Pleshette goes on to say of Freud’s little essay, each of Freud’s two 
companions is “unable to take pleasure in the beauty of the nature around 
him, because each has already begun to lament the fact that not only the 
particular beauty on this summer day but also all beauty found in nature 
and art is destined to decay and perish”.6 It is from this center that 
Pleshette’s own essay unfolds, as I said, in four times or four movements. 
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For if Kofman finds in Freud’s three-page essay at once “the desire for 
immortality, the ambivalent nature of beauty, mourning and melancholy, 
and affirmation in spite of loss”7, Pleshette will find in this description all 
the essential elements of Kofman’s own aesthetics, indeed, of her entire 
work. Pleshette thus scans her reading of Kofman’s book by beginning each 
section with an epigraph from Kofman’s self-description. It’s a masterful 
reading, attentive and intelligent, which I will be able to do little more than 
brutally summarize here. 
 In the first section, titled “The Mask of Beauty, or the Illusion of 
Immortality,” Pleshette argues—after citing in epigraph once again the first 
line of Kofman’s parsing of  “On Transience,” “and what if the beauty that 
hides the evanescent aspect of all things were itself ephemeral?”—Pleshette 
goes on to argue that the traditional function of beauty, as we find it in 
Plato’s Symposium or Phaedrus, for example, though also in art more 
generally, is to promise immortality by “awaken[ing] in those captivated by 
it a recollection of all that is eternal,” giving us “a beauty that escapes all 
decline and ruin, a beauty that is eternally luminous,” “restor[ing] our faith 
in the immortality of beauty or, more accurately, in beauty as immortality”.8 
But what if, Pleshette asks following Kofman, what if this beauty, which is 
supposed to mask and substitute for all that is fleeting and ephemeral, were 
itself ephemeral? 
 The answer comes in the second section, titled “An Economy of the 
Intolerable and Tolerable,” which bears the epigraph, again taken from the 
back cover, “The decline of what makes the intolerable tolerable would 
cause vertigo and disarray.” “To make the intolerable tolerable”—that is a 
phrase we find everywhere in Kofman’s corpus, from one end to the other. 
It’s almost her signature, her motto, the words by which she lived, because, 
as Pleshette explains, this is the function of art. Indeed “beauty’s power, 
according to Kofman, is not only to captivate and entrance, but also to ward 
off all that is utterly unbearable—‘the intolerable’”.9 The two figures that 
“exemplify the economy and logic of the tolerable and the intolerable,” 
Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus,” must thus be understood not as “two 
concepts” that oppose one another but as “two forces” that “conjure 
[conjurer] one another,” and Pleshette reminds us here that Kofman’s use of 
the word conjurer must be heard “in its double resonance: to conjure away or 
ward off and to conjure up or call forward”.10 Pleshette concludes this 
second section: “It is Nietzsche who showed Kofman that only the 
Apollonian image, which is by its nature beautiful, can render the 
intolerable—death, suffering, the ambiguities of becoming, in a word, the 
Dionysian—tolerable”.11 In the well-known words of Nietzsche, which 
Pleshette does not cite but Kofman does, putting them in quotes but, again, 
without attribution, “We have art so as not to die of truth”.12 
 The third section, “Catharsis, or an Impossible Mourning,” once again 
begins with an epigraph from Kofman: “This refusal of the mourning of 
8 0  |  E c h o i n g  S e n t i m e n t s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.696 
beauty reveals the cathartic function of art, which is as mystifying as the 
speculative . . .”.13 Art is thus complicit in the refusal of mourning, but this 
refusal is cathartic, even therapeutic. As Pleshette argues, “inherent in the 
nature of the artistic image is a certain power of occultation or mystification, 
which Kofman affirms as therapeutic”.14 If “Apollo’s blinding beauty brings 
about a ‘forgetting,’ a forgetting of his double, Dionysus,” this forgetting is, 
it seems, at once an illusion—a form of repression—and something 
originary, even necessary.15 Pleshette then asks, “Is that not art and beauty’s 
great power—to ward off death and thus to deny the need for mourning?”16 
Art represses the intolerable by giving us an illusion of eternity or 
immortality, but this repression appears necessary, even therapeutic. It is 
here that Pleshette, following all the ambiguities and aporias of Kofman’s 
thought, poses questions to that thought—irresolvable questions, I would 
hazard to say, for they are in the end Kofman’s own questions. Pleshette 
asks: “Is she arguing that the function of art is to create an illusion of 
‘blessed security,’ by transforming an intolerable ‘reality’ into a tolerable 
‘illusion’? Or is she, like the Freud of The Future of an Illusion, asking us to 
abandon all illusions, to grow up, to refuse to be childishly and 
narcissistically enchanted by art and beauty?”17 Pleshette’s answer to these 
questions is that Kofman does not, in the end, “decide between these two 
responses to art and beauty” and that what is thus required is “a double 
reading and a double affirmation of art,” one that “says ‘yes’ to the 
melancholy of, or the impossibility, of mourning beauty and ‘yes’ to the 
necessity of mourning the eternity of beauty”.18 
 The fourth and final section of Pleshette’s essay, “The Art of Amor 
Fati,” bears the epigraph, “To break with everything in art that responds to 
our desire for eternity is to dislocate the space of representation and 
meaning; it is to invent a space of indetermination and play—to open up a 
wholly other place.”19 To try to think what it would mean to break with this 
desire and to invent such “a space of indetermination and play,” Pleshette 
enlists the help of an untitled essay by Derrida on the work of Kofman in 
order then to distinguish what seems to be an unhealthy or life-denying 
desire for eternity from this space of indetermination and play. This allows 
Pleshette to say, for example, that Dorian Gray’s “fetishizing of beauty” in 
Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray is linked to his “inability to mourn its 
ephemeral nature”.20 Like Freud’s two walking companions in “On 
Transience,” Dorian “is incapable of affirming beauty or art and, hence, 
unable to affirm life”.21 By refusing death, by giving in to what is, for 
Kofman, “a fear of both death and life”22, one is unable to affirm life itself. 
For “this affirmative mourning is all too aware,” writes Pleshette, “that art 
and beauty cannot offer salvation from ‘pain, anxiety, illness—and death’”.23 
Which is why, in the closing lines of her essay, Pleshette opposes salvation 
to serenity, a curious word, serenity, so easy to say, and maybe even to 
imagine or to think, and yet so difficult to live. Pleshette writes: “Kofman 
does not negate the illusion of art and beauty, but affirms another light, 
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which still possesses pharmaceutical powers and provides serenity without 
salvation”.24 Such serenity without salvation would be that which 
accompanies, as Kofman has called it, “the non-illusory life of an illusion”25 
and the possibility of inventing “a space of indetermination and play,” in 
short “a wholly other space” and, says Pleshette citing Derrida, “another 
affirmation, other but older, more ancient,” but “also younger than 
everything it endures, through, and thus beyond, if this is possible, the 
experience of an impossible mourning become possible”.26 
That is where Pleshette ends her essay, with Derrida on the possibility 
of an impossible mourning. But let me end by returning to the place where 
she begins, and where she claims Kofman begins. In “On Transience” Freud 
says, after recalling the inability of his two friends to affirm the beauty that 
surrounds them, that two reactions can follow the recognition that 
everything must perish: “despondency” over the potential loss of beauty 
and “rebellion . . . against the fact of this inevitable loss,” in other words, 
mourning—or melancholy—and the refusal of mourning. How right Freud 
was about transience, Vergänglichkeit, in 1915 and how right he will have 
been a century later about the Vergänglichkeit that surrounds, surprises, and 
so stupefies us today, a transience, a thought of transience, that Kofman and 
Pleshette (not to mention Freud and Derrida) will have in some sense 
shared, or at least echoed—and maybe that makes a difference—echoed, this 
thought or this sentiment of Vergänglichkeit, not only between Narcissus and 
Echo, his Echo, but between this very other Narcissus and her Echo, echoed, 
then, across eras and cultures, generations and languages, for the French 
title of this essay—it and its echoes—says all this at once, somewhere 
between despondency and affirmation, rebellion and recognition, between 
conjuring death up and conjuring it away,27 the beautiful and beautifully 
melancholic French word and its echoes, L’éphémère . . . mère . . . ère, which 
recalls us to ourselves, we creatures of a day, but across generations, 
through a sentiment that is, if not shared, at least echoed within us. 
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